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THE EFFECT OF A DECISION SUSTAINING A
DEMURRER TO A COMPLAINT.
In the drawing of a complaint it is the duty of the draughts-
man to make the allegations according to the facts as he claims
them to be. It isprimafacie presumed that competent evidence
will be forthcoming at the proper time to establish their truth
in case any of them are denied. When a demurrer is filed to a
complaint the defendant, for the purposes of the demurrer,
admits the truth of the allegations thereof. The questions of law
thus raised are submitted to the court for decision, If the demur-
rer is sustained, the plaintiff may usually amend. In that case
no judgment is entered upon the demurrer. If the plaintiff ex-
ercises his privilege of amendment, a new fact or series of
facts are added to the old complaint, or some of the old ones are
omitted, or an entirely new statement is substituted for the one
held to be insufficient. If the plaintiff neglects to amend,
judgment for the defendant is entered upon the demurrer. It
is the effect of the decision sustaining such a demurrer that we
desire to consider.
If the plaintiff amends within the requisite time it is very
clear that the case stands as if no demurrer had ever been filed.
He may then compel the defendant to plead, or he may exercise
his right of withdrawal. But it may so happen that before the
plaintiff can amend he will be obliged to pay costs as a penalty
for his first mispleading and as compensation for the trouble
and expense which he has caused the defendant. He may con-
clude not to do this. An instance of this kind is found in the case
of Brennan v. The Berlin Iron Bridge Company, 71 Conn. 479. In
that case the plaintiff brought his action for damages said
to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant
company, which, as the complaint stated, was building,
by contract, a trestle for the Naugatuck Malleable Iron
Company. In the course of the work the defendant needed
the services of some extra help. Accordingly, two men
were loaned by The Malleable Iron Company to assist
the defendant's workmen. While so assisting, one of
them, Brennan, was injured. Under the Connecticut practice,
the case was defaulted by the defendant. The default was
afterwards opened and the plaintiff was permitted to amend.
To the complaint as amended the defendant demurred because,
upon the facts stated, it appeared that Brennan was in the
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position of a servant of the defendant and because it appeared
that he was injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant.
This was a demurrer which went to the substance of the action,
and it was sustained by the Superior Court. Afterwards, the
plaintiff filed, without leave of the court, and without the con-
sent of the defendant, a substituted complaint. The defendant
objected to the allowance of this second amendment and asked
that it be erased. The court ordered the substituted complaint
stricken from the files, but gave the plaintiff permission to
amend upon payment of twenty-five dollars costs. He failed and
neglected to amend, but before final judgment was entered up,
he filed a notice of withdrawal The defendant, thereupon,
moved that the attempted withdrawal be disallowed and that
judgment be entered upon the demurrer. The Superior Court
granted the motion and ordered that the judgment be entered.
In a suit between the same parties brought a year after the
date of this judgment, for damages caused by the same accident,
the plaintiff adopted for his complaint, the substituted one that
he had filed in the first case, and which was erased by the court,
but which he was then permitted to file upon the payment of
the costs as just stated. This new complaint contained alle-
gations different from those to which the demurrer had been
filed, and the new allegations were not demurrable. The de-
fendant again defaulted the case and claimed upon the hear-
ing in damages that the former judgment upon demurrer was
a bar to the prosecution of the second case. The Superior
Court overruled this claim and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff to recover substantial damages. Upon appeal the
Supreme Court held that the first judgment was a bar and
reversed the one rendered in the second case to nominal
damages.
The first effect in that case of the decision sustaining the
demurrer was to prevent a withdrawal thereafter of the suit.
No memorandum or opinion was ever filed by the judge who
disallowed the withdrawal, and this branch of the case was
never considered by the Supreme Court. We believe that the
withdrawal was properly disallowed.
The plaintiff, in filing it, was endeavoring to accomplish
something in which he ought not to be assisted by the court.
Such an exercise of the right of withdrawal ought not to be
favored. He was endeavoring to avoid payment of costs,
which the court had ordered him to pay, if he wished to go on
with the case. To allow a plaintiff to withdraw a case after a
full hearing and determination of such a demurrer, would
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, be to put the defendant to considerable trouble and expense.
When the parties have framed the issues to be tried and a
decision has'been rendered thereon, it is vexatious for the
defeated party to withdraw the case, and bring a new suit. If
a party could bring his case, and submit it to the court for
decision, and after decision against him, be permitted to with-
draw it and thus be rid of the adverse judgment, it would be
not only unjust to the other party, but trifling with the court
If he is not satisfied with the decision let him appeal from the
judgment.
The Connecticut statute which permits withdrawals is found
at the end of Section 988 of the General Statutes, 1 bvision x888,
and provides that "the plaintiff may withdraw any action * *
* before the jury have given in their verdict." A verdict of
the jury precedes the rendition of the judgment. So that the
case was one step further advanced than the verdict of a jury,
when the withdrawal was attempted. The demurrer admitted
the truth of the allegations of the complaint for the purposes
of the demurrer. Upon the argument of the demurrer it was
the same as if the jury had brought in a special verdict finding
the facts as alleged in the complaint, and a hearing was had
before the court as to the judgment to be rendered. A judg-
ment on demurrer is a final judgment and stands as such, un-
less the complaint is amended, until it is set aside by appeal or
proceedings in error. The case had been decided when the
attempted withdrawal was filed.
Black says, in treating of the different kinds of judgment,
that they may be "for the defendant when the issue raised by
a demurrer is determined in his favor. This is a final judg-
ment and disposes of the case, unless leave be granted to amend
the pleading, or withdraw the demurrer, as the case may be:"'
Swift says: "Final judgments are rendered at the termina-
tion of the suit. They may be rendered upon demurrer, ver-
dict, default, confession, nihil dicit, and nonsuit. i. In demur-
rers the facts are confessed, and the law only controverted; and
the court, on determining the question of law, must render
judgment for the party who has the law in his favor. 2. The
verdict of the jury ascertains the facts in dispute, and the court
must-render judgment for the party in whose favor the law is
found."'
I In some states, Connecticut with others, there is no statute
which governs cases tried by the court without a jury, and there
.I Black on Judgments, see. 13, par. 3.
I Swift Dig., p. 783.
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is some variance in the decisions upon the subject. At com-
mon law in England, the right of withdrawal continues up to
the time that "the judge has pronounced his judgment." ' In
our Federal Courts it has been held to exist "at any time before
the trial is opened to the court."' This rule has been adopted
in Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. In Pennsylva-
nia "the argument of a demurrer will put an end to the right
to discontinue."" A plaintiff in Oregon "is entitled to a volun-
tary nonsuit at any time before trial." And the court defines
the word "trial" to be "the judicial examination of the issues
between the parties, whether those issues be of law or of fact."o
In Moriarty v. Mason, 47 Conn. 438, our Supreme Court ob-
serves that there are no equities in favor of a party who desires
to withdraw a case after it has been decided against him by a com-
mittee, which has made out and handed its report to the counsel
for the prevailing party. The court held that a withdrawal
could not be allowed, although the report had not been accepted,
nor judgment thereon rendered, nor the report filed in court.
The second important effect of a decision sustaining a
demurrer to matters of substance, which is followed by a final
judgment, is that it operates as res adjudicata, and is a bar to any
subsequent suit between the same parties for the same cause of
action. This is so even if a judgment file has never been
drawn. That document is a mere formula which follows the
legal determination of the rights of the parties.'
The term "cause of action" has been defined as "matter for
which an action may be brought." But the term is often mis-
used and misunderstood. A concrete case may serve to present
the subject in a clearer light. In the case of Wildman v. Wild-
man, 70 Conn. 700, the plaintiff and defendant were brother and
sister respectively. In a prior suit between them, the plaintiff
had alleged that the defendant had in her possession, and had
caused to be recorded, two Written documents which purported
to be deeds conveying certain real estate from the plaintiff to the
defendant, and which had never been executed or delivered by
the plaintiff. He asked that the deeds be cancelled and set
aside. The parties were at issue as to the non-execution and
non-delivery of the deeds. Upon the trial of this case it was
3 Outhwaite v. Hudson, 7 Ex. Rep. 38o.
4 Johnson v. Bailey, 59 Fed. Rep. 611.
6 Kennedy v. McNickle, 2 Brewster 537.
'Hume v. Woodruff, 26 Oregon 373, citing Alley v. Nott, i U. S. 472.
'Clark v. Melton, 19 S. C. 507; Ball v. Trenholm, 45 Fed. Rep. 58g.
0 Bouvier Law Dict. (14 ed.) "Cause of Action."
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proved that the deeds were properly executed and delivered,
but that the property was put in the sister's name to prevent its
being subject to an unlawful claim which might arise against
the brother's-estate in case of his death, and that the sister with
full knowledge of the circumstances accepted the deeds and
that they were utterly without consideration and were after-
wards treated as void between the parties. During the
progress of this first trial the plaintiff sought to amend his com-
plaint, so as to state the facts as they existed, but the trial court
refused to give him that privilege, and rendered judgment for
the defendant. In the suit, which was afterwards brought, the
plaintiff alleged the facts as they really were. The defendant
pleaded the former judgment in bar alleging that the causes of
action were the same, and the Superior Court sustained the plea.
This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The causes
of action in the two suits were held to be identical.
A cause of action involves an essential right belonging to the
plaintiff and a corresponding essential wrong done by the de-
fendant. The right and the wrong may each be simple or
complicated. In either case there is but one essential right
and one essential wrong. The subordinate facts which go to
make up this right and this wrong are not themselves separate
causes of action.
In negligence cases the plaintiff, when defeated once, cannot
state his case in a different way claiming other acts of negli-
gence for the same accident. The judgment in the first action
is a bar to any subsequent suit. There is but one injury, and
the plaintiff can have but one cause of action against the
defendant. That cause of action is entire and cannot be split
up into several causes of action. The plaintiff having litigated
that cause of action in his.own way cannot have another day in
court.'
The other requisite of a judgment in order that it may
operate as a bar to another suit for the same cause of action be-
tween the same parties, is that the judgment should be upon the
merits.
An argument upon a demurrer to a complaint, which sets up
a certain state of facts from which it appears affirmatively that.
the plaintiff has no ground of recovery, is a trial of the case
upon its merits, and a judgment sustaining the demurrer is a
judgment on the merits.1
It frequently happens that a defendant files an answer
which sets up matters in confession and avoidance of those
Burritt v. Belfy, 47 Conn., 327.
10 Alley v. Nott, iii U. S. 475.
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alleged in the complaint, and that this answer is demurred to
by the plaintiff, and the demurrer sustained. Courts have made
a distinction between a judgment rendered upon such a de-
murrer sustained, and one rendered upon a demurrer to the
complaint. The ground for the distinction being that in the
former case the defendant has admitted for all purposes the
truth of the allegations of the complaint by not having denied
them, and that the judgment sustaining a demurrer to the
answer leaves the case without any answer and that thb judg-
ment is really rendered either upon default or by confession.
There are a large number of cases, in which it has been held
that a judgment rendered upon a demurrer for want of material
allegations in a complaint is only conclusive upon the identical
state of facts alleged,'and that such a judgment does not pre-
vent another action wherein the material facts are supplied,
although the suit is for the same cause of action. In other
words, if the facts are stated in a different manner in the second
action which is not demurrerable, it is maintained that the
former judgment is not a bar. It is admitted that it would be a
bar had the former judgment been upon pleadings and proofs.
The case of Wiggins Ferry Company v. 0. & M. Ry., 142 U. S. 41o,
is an example of this class of cases. But we believe, when a judg-
ment is rendered sustaining a demurrer to a complaint, not for
any want of material allegations, but because, upon the posi-
tive allegations therein contained, it appears that the plaintiff
has no right to recover, that such a judgment is a bar to any
subsequent suit for the same cause of action."1 Such a demurrer
does not raise issues which are technical or merely formal, but
ones which go to the merits of the action. It is the same as if
the defendant in the former case had denied the truth- of the
allegations of the complaint and a trial had taken place, and the
court had found all the allegations of the complaint true, and
made a finding in the exact language of the complaint, and then
the defendant had claimed that though the facts were as the
plaintiff alleged, still he has not entitled to recover. The plain-
tiff would have no cause to complain because the court had
found the facts just as he claimed them to be.
Does the fact that a judgment was rendered upon demurrer
prevent its being a bar or an estoppel? Nemo debetbis vexaripro una
et eadem causa, is a most salutary maxim, and as a rule of public
policy should receive a liberal construction. It matters little
how the facts are arrived at, whether by trial or by an agreed
statement, or by an admissin of their truth. A plaintiff surely
"Gould v. Evansville, etc., R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 532-534-
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ought not to object that the facts are of record just as he has
alleged them to be, and as lie permits them to remain, when
final judgment is rendered upon them.
If this is not so, a plaintiff, having been defeated upon a sub-
stantial demurrer and without further amendment, suffering
final judgment to go against him, may bring a second suit,
changing slightly the allegations, and will be entitled to another
trial, and if defeated again, may bring a third suit, and so on
indefinitely, until prevented by the statute of limitations.
It is the duty of the plaintiff to allege all the facts connected
with the transaction in his original complaint. After the
demurrer is sustained he may generally amend. If he fails
and neglects to embrace the opportunity, it is presumed
that he desires to stand upon the facts as he has alleged them.
We think a judgment, rendered upon a demurrer to positive
facts which appear in the complaint, is, and ought to be, as
binding as a judgment after verdict finding those same facts.
Where a demurrer is interposed and sustained because of lack
of allegations, then the judgment is not upon the merits, and
is not a bar. But where a plaintiff sets up certain positive facts
and asks the court for a determination of his rights thereon,
and a demurrer properly raises the merits of the case, a final
judgment upon those merits ought to be binding upon both
parties and prevent further litigation upon the same cause of
action between them. It should prevent the plaintiff from
stating his facts in a different way and having another trial
thereon. He is presumed to have alleged them correctly in his
first action, otherwise courts will become tribunals to try
mooted and imaginary, instead of actual, questions.
Gould, in his work on Pleading, says: "A judgment ren-
dered upon demurrer is equally conclusive (by way of estoppel)
of the facts confessed by the demurrer, as a verdict finding the
same facts would have been; since they are established, as well
in the former case as in the latter, by way of record. .And facts
thus established, can never afterwards be contested between
the same parties, or those in privity With them."'1  The princi-
ples here sought to be maintained are supported by several
decisions, and by at least two writers of text-books."
1 Gould on Pleading, chap. IX, part I, sec. 43.
23 Gould v. Evansville R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 543; Alley v. Nott, iii U. S.
475; Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225; Lamb v. McConkey,
(Iowa) 40 N. W. 77; Coffin v. Knott, 2 Green (Iowa) 582; Kleinschmidt v. Bin-
zel, 14 Mont. 31; Sc. 43 Amer. SL Rep. 604; Strain v. Illinois Central R. R.
Co. (Miss.) iS So. 847; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.) p. 56; I VanFleets
Former Adjudication, p. 322, sec. iog.
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Suppose a man brings his action for damages caused by in-
juries resulting from the negligence of a railroad company,
and in his complaint it appears that he is a servant of the de-
fendant and was injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant,
and that the defendant filed no demurrer but defaulted the case
and had a hearing in damages. In that hearing, suppose the
court had found the facts in the exact language of the com-
plaint, and had rendered judgment for the recovery of nominal
damages. Would not such a judgment b& a bar to any subse-
quent action for that injury? We understand the difference be-
tween such a judgment and one upon demurrer to positive facts
alleged, to be that upon the sustaining of the demurrer leave
is usually given to amend. But if the plaintiff fail to amend,
either of his own election, or because the court refuses to allow
him to do so, and he suffers final judgment against him, and
fails to appeal, he then stands upon the same footing as in the
case of judgment on a hearing in damages and is precluded from
again putting the defendant to the annoyance of another suit
for the same injury. He has had his day in court, litigated
his case in his own way, and had it decided.
If the demurrer had been overruled and the defendant had
failed to plead over, judgment would have gone for the plaintiff
on demurrer overruled. It makes no difference whether the
plaintiff in that case could have recovered substantial damages
or only nominal damages, the effect would be the same, and the
plaintiff would have been precluded from bringing another
action for the same injury.
Our conclusion, therefore is, that after a substantial de-
murrer to affirmative allegations in a complaint has been sus-
tained, the plaintiff by failing to take advantage of his privilege
to amend, and to make his original action good, has waived his
rights. The judgment becomes conclusive upon him, and is a
bar to any subsequent suit for the same cause of action.
SEYMOUR C. Loomis.
New Haven, June iSth, igoo.
